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Abstract 
If you have ever tilted your head to perceive a rotated image, or programmed a smartphone to 
remind you of an upcoming appointment, you have engaged in cognitive offloading: the use of 
physical action to alter the information processing requirements of a task in order to reduce 
cognitive demand. Despite the ubiquity of this sort of behavior, it has only recently become the 
target of systematic investigation in and of itself. Here we review research from a number of 
domains focusing on two main questions: a) what mechanisms trigger cognitive offloading, and 
b) what are the cognitive consequences of this behavior? We offer a novel metacognitive 
framework that integrates results from diverse domains and suggests avenues for future research. 
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Offloading Cognition 
A moment’s reflection on our day-to-day cognitive lives reveals the intimate relation 
between human cognition and manipulation of the body and objects in the physical environment. 
We tilt our heads while trying to perceive ambiguous images, we gesture while imagining spatial 
transformations, and we rely on smartphones and search engines to store and retrieve 
information. In other words, we often think using our bodies and the external world. This ability 
to flexibly deploy ad hoc mixtures of internal and external processes in pursuit of our cognitive 
goals likely represents a defining feature of what it means to be a successful cognitive agent in a 
complex environment [1-4]. One critical function that these mind/body/world interactions afford 
is cognitive offloading - the use of physical action to alter the information processing 
requirements of a task in order to reduce cognitive demand (see also computational offloading 
[5]; epistemic actions [6]). Our unaided mental abilities have well-known limits (e.g. we can 
only accurately perceive a relatively small region of the visual field [7] and can only hold a 
limited amount of information active in memory [8]). Offloading cognition helps us to overcome 
such capacity limitations, minimize computational effort, and achieve cognitive feats that would 
not otherwise be possible. Consistent with this notion, cognitive offloading has been 
demonstrated to improve performance across a number of domains (e.g., perception [9]; memory 
[10]; arithmetic [11]; counting [12]; spatial reasoning [13]). 
The term cognitive offloading has long existed in the conceptual repertoire of cognitive 
scientists and the phenomenon it refers to is ancient (e.g., finger-counting and abacuses in 
numerical cognition, systems of knots or quipus for memory [14]). However, cognitive 
offloading has rarely been the target of systematic experimental investigation in and of itself. 
This has now begun to change. This change has been precipitated by an increasing interest 
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amongst cognitive scientists in “wider” conceptions of cognition (e.g., embodied, embedded, 
extended, and distributed approaches [2-3, 15-20]). In addition, increased interest in cognitive 
offloading is emerging at a time when the opportunity to offload cognition onto technological 
prostheses has reached a kind of fever pitch – the potential consequences of which (both bad and 
good) have not gone unnoticed by the general public (“Is Google Making Us Stupid?”; [21]). 
Thus research on cognitive offloading offers both a deeper understanding of the physically 
distributed nature of human cognition and translational insights into its potential use (and abuse) 
in our day-to-day lives. Here we review recent research investigating cognitive offloading across 
three different domains, focusing on two fundamental issues: (a) what factors influence the 
likelihood of individuals offloading cognition versus relying on internal processes alone, and (b) 
what are the cognitive consequences of this behaviour?  
Thinking with the Body 
Cognitive offloading can be roughly subdivided into actions that offload cognitive 
demands onto-the-body and into-the-world. We turn first to the former. Recent research in 
cognitive science has focused on how we actively use our bodies in the “here-and-now” to 
reduce cognitive demand. For example, we use our eyes to index locations in space [22], we use 
our fingers, point, or nod our head to mark positions in sequential tasks [12, 23], we move our 
hands to externalize thoughts [11, 24-25] and to simulate spatial transformations [13], and we 
move or shift our body to simplify perceptual computations [9]. In each of these cases an action 
is spontaneously performed in the context of an ongoing cognitive act in order to generate some 
form of cognitive savings.  
A straightforward example of this type of cognitive offloading is external 
normalization. For instance, when individuals encounter a rotated stimulus (e.g., a tilted book) 
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they often physically tilt their head to normalize its orientation. This behaviour is an example of 
external normalization and can be considered a means of offloading internal normalization, 
which is an internal transformation (in this case mental rotation) that aligns a representation of a 
stimulus with a representation stored in memory [26-27]. Indeed, external normalization can 
reduce the costs of stimulus rotation [9]. One of the major tasks in understanding cognitive 
offloading is to determine the factors that influence whether some external means is integrated 
into the performance of a given cognitive act or not. In the context of external normalization, one 
of the critical factors is internal demand. Specifically, individuals are more likely to spontaneously 
physically rotate as the display becomes more disoriented or as the number of items in the 
display increases [9]. Critically, both of these manipulations also increase stimulus-rotation costs 
(i.e., internal demand; see Box 1 and Figure 1 Panel A for a general description of this 
methodology). Thus, as the internal demands associated with stimulus rotation increase, the 
likelihood of spontaneous external normalization also increases. This general pattern has now 
been observed across several domains (e.g., external normalization [9]; prospective memory 
[10]; short-term memory [29]; co-speech gesture [30]; co-thought gesture [13]; see Figure 2 
representative examples). 
While the relation between internal demand and cognitive offloading is robust, they are 
nevertheless dissociable. This was revealed in an investigation of external normalization using 
arrays of words wherein both the words and the frame (i.e., the overall structure of a multi-
element array) were rotated, versus arrays where the words were rotated but presented within an 
upright frame ([32]; see Figure 1 Panel A). These two conditions yield similar rotation costs and 
similar responses on a physiological measure of demand [32-33].  Yet spontaneous rates of 
external normalization are much higher when both the words and frame are rotated compared to 
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when only the words are rotated. This dissociation is argued to arise because individuals rely on 
an erroneous metacognitive evaluation of demand. This evaluation may be led astray by intuitive 
beliefs regarding the effects of stimulus rotation, or a history of external normalization with 
displays featuring word and frame rotation. Consistent with this account, individuals incorrectly 
report that rotated word and frame displays are more time consuming and error-prone, and judge 
these displays to be more effortful to read than displays with only the words rotated [32].  
Putting Cognition Into-The-World 
Like offloading cognition onto-our-body, offloading cognition into-the-world is a 
ubiquitous part of our everyday cognitive lives [4, 14, 34-35]. A key way in which we offload 
cognitive processes into-the-world is by using it as a repository of representational information, 
thus eliminating the need for an internal representation. For example, individuals might write 
down [29], type into a computer [36-37], sketch [38] or in some other manner alter the 
environment in order to record information that needs to be remembered [14, 39]. We discuss 
examples of this below. 
Offloading Memory - Prospective Memory 
We rely on memory not just to recall information from the past, but also to execute 
intended behaviours in the future. Our ability to remember delayed intentions is termed 
‘prospective memory’ [40-41]. Everybody is familiar with its fallibility: failures of prospective 
memory probably comprise a majority of self-reported everyday memory problems [42]. What 
makes remembering delayed intentions particularly difficult is that, in many cases, our intentions 
are not effectively triggered by perceptual cues in our environment, and therefore action must be 
self-initiated. It is therefore unsurprising that people have long supported prospective memory by 
using external tools to supply perceptual cues that can trigger intended actions. Examples include 
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tying knots in handkerchiefs, placing reminders in the environment (e.g. post-it notes or task-
relevant objects), or – in recent times – using smartphones or wearable devices that can provide 
time-, location- or person-based reminders [43-44]. This form of cognitive offloading – acting on 
the environment to create external triggers for delayed intentions – has been referred to as 
‘intention offloading’ [10, 45]. Laboratory studies of prospective memory have generally 
considered our tendency to outsource intentions to external tools as a source of noise that 
obscures ‘real’ prospective memory processes, and prevented individuals from setting external 
reminders [e.g. 46]. However, intention offloading is likely central to our ability to remember 
intentions in the real world, and hence an important topic for investigation. This process was 
investigated empirically in a recent series of behavioral [10, 45] and neuroimaging [47] studies 
illustrated in Figure 1 Panel B.  
 Like tilting one’s head to read rotated text, intention offloading is influenced by the 
internal demands that would otherwise be necessary (see Figure 2). Individuals are more likely to 
offload intentions when their memory load increases or when they encounter interruptions; both 
of these factors impair performance when offloading is prevented [10]. However, and again 
analogously to external normalization, intention offloading is not only driven by objective need 
but also by a potentially erroneous metacognitive evaluation of demand. This was demonstrated 
in a study where individuals remembered delayed intentions both with and without the ability to 
set reminders, and also provided predictions about their performance. Individuals with lower 
confidence in their memory abilities were more likely to spontaneously set reminders, even after 
controlling for any influence of objective ability (which also predicted intention offloading [45]). 
Interestingly, this relation with metacognitive confidence is domain general. When individuals 
performed a separate perceptual judgement task where accuracy was held constant with a 
Cognitive Offloading 8 
	
staircase procedure, individuals with lower confidence in their perceptual judgements set more 
reminders in the intention offloading task [45]. Thus, intention offloading is related not only to 
individual differences in objective ability but also to domain-specific and domain-general 
metacognitive confidence. 
Once an individual has opted to offload, what are the consequences for information 
processing? In the context of intention offloading, placing information into the external 
environment brings several potential benefits. One of the most salient is that offloaded 
representations may be more durable and less prone to distortion than those stored internally, 
leading to an increased likelihood of intention fulfillment [10, 45]. However, it is important to 
note that individuals also set reminders in conditions where doing so led to no objective increase 
in accuracy [10, 45]. This also occurs in the context of external normalization [9]. This tendency 
to engage in offloading despite it not benefiting performance may result from (1) an undetected 
performance benefit (2) a bias against cognitive effort (see Box 2) and/or (3) an erroneous 
metacognitive belief that the offloading will in fact benefit performance. Support for the latter 
interpretation comes from recent research examining offloading in a short-term memory task 
[29]. Participants were allowed to offload to-be-remembered materials (i.e., by writing them 
down) and did so about 40% of the time when they had to remember only two items, a memory 
load at which performance was already at ceiling without offloading. Critically, individuals 
erroneously judged that offloading would improve their performance in this latter condition. 
Thus, the putatively superfluous offloading (observed across a number of domains) underlines 
again the importance of metacognitive beliefs in cognitive offloading. 
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Offloading Memory - Transactive memory 
While research reviewed thus far has focused little on the cognitive consequences of 
offloading, recent research on transactive memory has made this issue its primary focus. In 
‘transactive memory systems’, knowledge is distributed across two or more individuals such 
that the system as a whole knows more than any one individual [52-54]. Recent research has 
extended this notion of socially distributed memory to human-technology transactive memory 
systems [36, 55-59]. Our ability to reliably store and (almost) instantaneously retrieve 
information has changed drastically with the advent of the computer and the Internet. 
Consequently we can now offload much of what in the past would have been stored internally.  
To examine the idea that offloading might impair our memory, in one study individuals 
were presented with a series of trivia statements to remember and had to type them into a 
computer. In addition, half the individuals expected that the information would be saved and half 
expected it to be erased [36]. Recall tests demonstrated that those in the latter condition had 
better memory than the former. The authors argued that memory-encoding demands were 
offloaded onto the external store leading to memory impairments when it was not available ([36]; 
see Box 3 for additional costs of cognitive offloading). Interestingly, these offloading-based 
memory impairments can be accompanied by enhanced memory for other information. For 
example, when individuals saved an initial list of words it enhanced memory for a second list 
[37]. The authors argued that saving reduced the likelihood that the first list of words interfered 
with memory for the second (i.e., reduced proactive interference; see also [60])	
Offloading memory demands in a transactive system is not a “free pass” in terms of 
mnemonic requirements. Rather, a defining attribute of a transactive memory system is a shift 
from remembering “what” to remembering “where.” For example, when you offload information 
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about a meeting to a file on your computer, you no longer need to remember the content of the 
file, but you do need to remember where to find it. Consistent with this idea, saving an external 
file can lead to an enhanced ability to recall where to find information, at the expense of 
remembering what it actually is ([36]; for an alternative explanation see [60]). Similarly, when 
faced with a failure to recall memory content, thoughts about memory location can be primed 
relatively automatically. This was demonstrated in a study where individuals answered easy or 
difficult trivia questions, then completed a variant of the Stroop task [36]. Stroop-like 
interference from words relating to Internet search engines was increased after individuals 
answered difficult compared with easy questions, consistent with those terms being primed in 
individuals’ minds. 
Beyond its influence on memory, being part of a human-technology transactive memory 
system can also have subtle effects on metacognition. For example, searching for information 
online about one topic can lead individuals to believe that they have more knowledge “in-the-
head” and generate more “brain activity” when answering questions about another topic [55]. In 
a separate line of experiments, individuals who had recently used Google to help them complete 
a quiz reported higher levels of cognitive self-esteem. They also predicted that they would do 
better on a subsequent quiz, even without help from external resources [56-58]. These results 
suggest that participating in a human-Internet transactive memory system can lead individuals to 
blur the distinction between what they know and what the Internet “knows.” However, this 
outcome does not occur in all circumstances. In another study, participants had to report whether 
they knew the answer to a general knowledge question or not. In one condition, if participants 
responded that they did not know the answer, they looked it up on the Internet. In a second 
condition, if participants responded that they did not know the answer, they simply moved on to 
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the next question. Thus, participants had access to the Internet in one condition and no access in 
the other. Critically, when they knew they would subsequently have access to the Internet, 
participants were more likely to answer “don’t know” and reported lower feeling-of-knowing to 
the trivia questions [59]. Thus, Internet access in this context reduced individuals’ willingness to 
offer an answer to a question based on their own knowledge. Taken together this research 
underscores the fact that opportunities to offload cognition can affect both lower-level cognitive 
systems (e.g., memory) and higher-level metacognitive evaluations of those systems (e.g., 
confidence). 
Metacognition of the Extended Mind 
The reviewed research suggests that theorising on cognitive offloading may benefit from 
further investigation of the metacognitive aspects of both the processes that trigger cognitive 
offloading and the consequences of this behavior. We offer a framework to support this effort 
here (see Figure 3, Key Figure). This framework describes situations in which there are two or 
more ways of achieving a goal, one of which involves cognitive offloading and one of which 
does not. In these circumstances, offloading represents a kind of strategy to achieve some 
cognitive goal, and follows a strategy selection phase [75-79]. This strategy selection phase is 
influenced by a metacognitive evaluation of the available options (see arrow A in Figure 3). In 
particular, it is informed by metacognitive beliefs (relating to the person, task, and strategy) and 
experiences (e.g., effort; [32, 34, 81-82]) that are associated with internal and more “extended” 
strategies (i.e., those integrating an external body- or physical environment-based resource). For 
example, when faced with a need to remember a given piece of information our knowledge 
regarding our previous success with internal (e.g., metacognitive confidence) and external 
storage [45, 84-85], our beliefs about the reliability of a particular external store [37], and/or a 
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feeling of fluency could all contribute to whether an individual stores that information internally 
or offloads the memory demands into-the-world. This framework places at center stage a need 
for a deeper understanding of the metacognitions associated with cognitive offloading and 
generates a number of interesting avenues for future research [see Outstanding Questions Box]. 
It is important to note that the strategy selection phase postulated above does not 
necessarily imply that individuals are aware of making a choice [see 86-87 for discussion of this 
issue]. Clearly, there is a range of situations that putatively involve cognitive offloading, some of 
which involve conscious deliberation and others of which do not. For example, gesture, which is 
often associated with cognitive offloading, can occur without individuals necessarily being aware 
of it. On the other hand, choosing between navigating based on stored knowledge versus 
plugging a set of coordinates into a GPS device is likely more strongly associated with a 
phenomenology of deliberation and choice. Thus, an important question within the proposed 
framework will be to examine the extent to which different forms of cognitive offloading involve 
conscious deliberation or not and how these cases are similar or distinct.  
Our framework also attempts to capture the downstream effects of cognitive offloading 
on how we think. As reviewed above, recent work has demonstrated that the experience of 
offloading cognition [55-58] and the opportunity to do so [59] can in and of itself alter our 
thinking about our internal capacities (i.e., our metacognitions; see arrow B in Figure 3). For 
example, offloading information retrieval onto the Internet can inflate our estimates of our own 
knowledge [55-58]. In addition, this work has demonstrated that cognitive offloading can have 
both costs and benefits with respect to basic cognitive processes (see arrow C in Figure 3). For 
example, offloading to-be-remembered information can both aid and impair retrieval from 
internal memory stores [36-37]. It should also be noted that, beyond reducing cognitive demand, 
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offloading could also qualitatively change the processes involved in thinking, communicating, 
and learning, potentially with both positive and negative consequences [13-14].  
The metacognitive framework offered here also highlights potential interactions between 
offloading and the mechanisms that trigger this behaviour. For example, deciding whether to rely 
on a GPS device for the location of a friend’s house versus our internal memory will be informed 
by beliefs in each method’s relative accuracy (a computation that will likely favour the former 
strategy; arrow A). The tendency to offload wayfinding to the more accurate GPS will likely 
reduce both our internal spatial memory for that location [arrow C; 61-63] and our metacognitive 
confidence in it (arrow B), which will in turn increase the likelihood that we choose to rely on 
the external artefact in the future (arrow A). Thus the model predicts a kind of self-reinforcing 
pattern that will produce a drift away from reliance on internal capabilities when situated in an 
environment with effective cognitive technologies (see [88] for an example of this kind of drift 
in the context of Inuit wayfinding). Understanding the long-term cognitive consequences of this 
drift represents an important area of future research.  
Practical Implications 
Research investigating cognitive offloading has clear practical implications - two of 
which we highlight here. First, individuals with impaired unaided cognitive ability may 
particularly benefit from cognitive offloading. How can those who would benefit the most be 
encouraged to do so [89]? The metacognitive model of cognitive offloading put forward in this 
article suggests that compensatory offloading strategies are most likely to be adopted in 
individuals with metacognitive awareness of their impairment. This implies potential challenges 
in populations with metacognitive difficulties, for example in cases of acquired brain injury 
where there can be a mismatch between an individual’s metacognitive evaluation of their 
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abilities - built up over a lifetime - and the post-injury reality  [90-91]. Improving metacognitive 
insight in cases such as these could lead to more appropriate compensatory offloading [92]  
The second general area in which research on cognitive offloading has important 
practical implications is education [11, 24, 93-94]. There has long been interest in the potential 
utility of educational interventions and aids that allow children to offload some of the cognitive 
demand while learning (e.g., manipulatives; [93-94]; calculators [95-96]). For example, gesture 
helps children learn by “lightening the load” [11] and, interestingly, this benefit appears to 
outstrip that garnered by offloading demands onto external manipulatives [97]. The latter 
suggests the need to consider whether different forms of offloading might have different 
educational consequences.  Critically, any benefit of offloading will be contingent on the fact 
that the demand being offloaded is unnecessary with respect to the learning goal (see [98] for 
relevant distinctions between necessary/intrinsic/germane and unneccesary/extraneous load in 
learning). In addition, it is important that what is “saved” by offloading is redistributed 
productively rather than being re-allocated to superfluous activities [e.g., intentional mind 
wandering [99]; see Box 2 for a similar issue in the case of automating driving].  
Concluding Remarks 
Cognitive offloading represents one of the quintessential examples of how we use our 
body and objects in the external world to help us think. As such, understanding this phenomenon 
provides a window into the distributed nature of human cognition. It is clear from the present 
review that offloading can take many forms, but that common patterns exist across domains. In 
particular, the evidence reviewed above shows that internal demand and metacognitive 
evaluations of demand play a critical role in offloading. Furthermore, cognitive offloading can 
have downstream effects on our low-level cognitive capacities and our subsequent 
Cognitive Offloading 15 
	
metacognitions. We have suggested that an important future direction for this research will be to 
better understand the metacognitive processes involved in cognitive offloading and have offered 
a framework to guide this effort. Beyond metacognition, there is a clear need to better understand 
how offloading demands onto various technologies (e.g., computers, Internet, GPSs) impact our 
organic abilities both in the short- and long-term. The latter represents a particularly pressing 
concern both for researchers and society in general as our lives come to be more cognitively 
entangled with these technologies. Conducting this needed research, however, is not without 
challenge. For example, investigating cognitive offloading often requires allowing research 
participants to move their body and manipulate and interact with their environment. Methods in 
cognitive science, however, have traditionally been designed to restrict this type of natural 
behaviour [100-101]. Thus, understanding cognitive offloading will require an expansion of the 
cognitive scientist’s methodological toolbox. This and other challenges notwithstanding, future 
research investigating cognitive offloading promises a deeper understanding of one of the 
defining attributes of human cognition. 
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Glossary 
Cognitive offloading: The use of physical action to alter the information processing 
requirements of a task in order to reduce cognitive demand. 
Internal normalization: Use of an internal transformation (i.e. mental rotation) to align an 
internal representation of a stimulus with a representation stored in memory. 
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External normalization: The use of physical action (e.g. head tilt) to align a stimulus with a 
representation stored in memory. 
Intention offloading: Creation of a cue in the external environment to trigger a delayed 
intention. 
Transactive Memory System: A memory system composed of a group that collectively 
encodes, stores, and retrieves knowledge.  
Stroop Task: A reaction time task involving conflict between two stimulus dimensions (e.g. the 
color and meaning of word stimuli). 
Metacognition: Higher-order thinking, or “thinking about thinking”, to enable evaluation and 
control of one’s mental processes. 
Feeling-of-Knowing: Predictions made by an individual about whether they will be able to 
retrieve specific information. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Caption. Paradigms for investigating cognitive offloading. Panel A: In the external 
normalization paradigm [9] participants read arrays of words that are presented in upright or 
rotated orientations. When faced with rotated words, participants can align them using internal 
cognitive processes (‘internal normalization’) or physical action (‘external normalization’). Panel 
B: In the intention offloading paradigm [10] participants use a mouse or touchscreen to drag 
numbered circles in sequence to the bottom of the screen. They are also instructed at the 
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beginning of the trial that one or more of these circles should be dragged to an alternative 
location. They can either remember these intentions internally or offload them by dragging target 
circles towards their intended location at the beginning of the trial. In some ways this is 
analogous to everyday offloading behavior such as leaving an item by the front door so that we 
will remember it when leaving the house. For a demonstration of the task, please visit 
“http://samgilbert.net/offloadDemo.html”. Illustrations modified with permission from [9] and 
[47]. 
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Figure 2 Caption. Relation between Internal Demand and Cognitive Offloading 
There exists a consistent relation between the amount of internal demand, as indexed in a 
condition where offloading is restricted, and the amount of spontaneous offloading behavior 
observed in a condition where the behavior is not restricted. This has been demonstrated across a 
number of different domains. With respect to external normalization (Panel A) as the internal 
costs of stimulus rotation increase when individuals are forced to remain upright (i.e., see 
rotation costs in ms/degree in “Restricted Motion Conditions”; larger values represent greater 
costs), the likelihood that an individual spontaneously physical rotates increases (i.e., see “Free 
Rotation Conditions”; larger values represent a higher frequency of offloading; [9]). In intention 
offloading (Panel B) and short-term memory (Panel C) as the unaided memory performance 
decreases (see “Accuracy without intention offloading” in Panel B and “Accuracy: No Choice” 
in Panel C), the likelihood that an individual spontaneously offloads the memory demands into 
the environment (i.e., setting reminders; writing the to-be-remembered items down) increases 
(see “Intentions offloaded when possible” in Panel B and “Choice Behavior” in Panel C; in both 
cases higher values represent a higher frequency of offloading; [10, 29]). Graphs modified with 
permission from [9], [29], and [45]. 
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Figure 3 Caption: A metacognitive model of cognitive offloading	
We propose that selecting between offloading and relying on internal processes is influenced by 
metacognitive evaluations of our (internal) mental capacities and the capacities of our extended 
mental systems encompassing body and world (arrow a). An example of this would be 
evaluating our unaided spatial memory and a GPS system when deciding how to navigate to a 
friend’s house. In addition, engaging in either internal or extended strategies can influence 
subsequent metacognitive evaluations (arrow b). For instance, after successful use of a GPS 
system we may come to believe that it is a more reliable guide than our unaided memory. 
Offloading can also directly impact our lower-level cognitive processes (arrow c). An example of 
this would be a reduction in our internal spatial memory for a location after reliance on GPS 
navigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive Offloading 30 
	
Box 1. Methods: The Choice/No Choice Paradigm 
Research on cognitive offloading has relied heavily on variants of the Choice/No Choice 
paradigm [31]. The application of the paradigm is straightforward: In some conditions 
participants are forced (i.e., they have no choice) to employ a particular strategy and in others 
they are free (i.e., they have the choice) to select amongst a set of available strategies. Each 
condition and the comparison between conditions provides answers to theoretically interesting 
questions. In addition, these conditions are typically paired with one or more other manipulations 
that influence some variable of interest (e.g., memory load). Below we provide an illustrative 
example using offloading memory onto an external medium (e.g., a piece of paper, a computer).  
No Choice – Internal: Individuals are tasked with remembering a given piece of information 
without being able to store it externally. This condition provides a measure of performance when 
the individual has to rely solely on their internal memory. 
No Choice – External: Individuals are tasked with remembering a given piece of information 
and must store it externally. This condition provides a measure of performance when the 
individual uses external memory. It is important to note that unlike the No Choice – Internal 
condition this condition cannot ensure that the information is not also stored internally. The 
comparison of the two No Choice conditions provides a measure of the relative effectiveness of 
storing information internally and externally. This comparison is often made as a function of 
some other variable (e.g., the amount of to-be-remembered information). 
Choice: Participants are allowed to freely choose between storing information internally or 
externally. This condition provides a measure of the spontaneous offloading of memory demands 
onto the external medium. Again, how the spontaneous offloading of memory demands changes 
as a function of some other variable (e.g., the amount of to-be-remembered information) is 
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typically of interest. This condition also provides a measure of performance when the individual 
uses their “preferred” strategy. 
Challenges: The choice/no choice paradigm is not without challenges. As noted above, 
attempting to force individuals to adopt a strategy might not be effective in some circumstances. 
In addition, forcing individuals to use a particular strategy could introduce demands associated 
with having to inhibit the use of another possibly preferred strategy. For example, restricting 
individuals from gesturing could impose its own load associated with inhibiting naturally 
occurring gestures [11].  
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Box 2. Perspectives on Cognitive Impartiality 
In discussions about cognitive offloading a central question arises with respect to whether the 
cognitive system has an inherent bias away from certain types of effort. For example, in selecting 
between storing information in short-term memory (i.e., in-the-head) or writing that information 
down (i.e., in-the-world; [29]) individuals are selecting the type of effort that will be required to 
carry out the task – more internal or cognitive effort in the former case and external or 
perceptual-motor effort in the latter case. Two views have dominated discussions of this issue 
(see [2] for further discussion). On the cognitive impartiality view the cognitive system has no 
bias or is indifferent to the type of effort required. For example, according the Soft Constraints 
Hypothesis [48-49] it is not the kind of effort but rather the amount of time required that 
determines the preferred solution (i.e., the solution with the shorter time being the preferred one). 
An alternative view, which might be called the “cognitive miser” view, is that individuals have 
an inherent bias against expending cognitive effort. There has been much recent work on 
individual’s tendency to avoid this type of effort [50-51]. One influential theoretical position that 
embodies this view is the Minimal Memory view [22] according to which the cognitive system is 
biased toward minimizing demands on memory (even in the face of potentially greater 
perceptual-motor costs). Between these theoretical signposts likely lay a number of interesting 
alternatives, for example, individuals may have idiosyncratic biases in one direction or the other, 
or variable task-dependent biases. Future work aimed at adjudicating between these and related 
views will provide deeper understanding of the how the cognitive system distributes resources 
across brain, body, and world. 
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Box 3. Beyond Google: Costs of Offloading 
GPS: Many people now travel using global positioning systems. Offloading wayfinding onto 
such a device has been demonstrated to impair spatial memory [61-63]. For example, in one 
study individuals who drove a pre-determined route using a turn-by-turn navigation system 
outperformed individuals who had no aid. However, individuals in the former group had poorer 
memory for scenes from the route and when asked to drive the route a second time without an 
aid did more poorly [63].  
Cameras: In an examination of the influence of taking a picture on memory, individuals visited 
a number of objects and either took a picture or simply observed the object [64]. Memory for the 
objects tested a day later revealed impaired memory for the photographed objects. In a 
subsequent experiment, taking a picture of only part of the object, rather than the whole object, 
to some extent ameliorated this cost [64].  It was argued that the act of taking a photograph led 
individuals to offload the memory for the object onto the camera [64]. The impairment observed 
here is particularly interesting because individuals did not necessarily expect to have the pictures 
available during the memory test. Thus, the de-prioritization of information that is potentially 
available externally might occur spontaneously [65]. 
Automation: In many cases the decision to offload is not made by the individual. Rather, 
offloading is “built-in” to the task environment by design. This could reflect a desire to increase 
usability [66-67] or automate tasks entirely [68-70]. With respect to offloading associated with 
automation, research has focused on two costs that have been observed across a number of 
safety-critical situations (e.g., aviation, medicine, driving), specifically, automation 
complacency, the failure to be sufficiently vigilant with respect to the performance of automated 
processes, and automation bias, the tendency to uncritically rely on the output of a automated 
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decision aid [68]. The long-term reliance on automated processes could also lead to cognitive 
“skill decay” where a developed ability deteriorates over time [71-73]. Recent research has 
highlighted the fact that the consequences of automation on performance can be tied closely to 
how individuals allocate resources freed up by automation. For example, driving a highly 
automated vehicle can improve situation awareness relative to manual driving if individuals are 
motivated to attend to the environment but can impair it if they decide to devote “freed 
resources” to driving-unrelated tasks [74]. 
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Figure 1 
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